Abstract: In 1683 the Bank of Amsterdam introduced a form of fiat money that successfully competed with the coinage of the time. We argue that the principal motive for this monetary innovation was the uncertain value of coins circulating within the Dutch Republic. The Bank's fiat money regime persisted until the downfall of the Dutch Republic in 1795 and incorporated modern features such as gross settlement of financial obligations, open market operations, central bank repurchase agreements (the equivalent thereof), and emergency liquidity facilities.
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The Bank of Amsterdam through the Lens of Monetary Competition
A paradoxical aspect of any modern economy is that its most sought-after asset-fiat moneymay also be its least intuitive. Fiat money, by definition, consists of only irredeemable claims: banknotes or entries in the accounts of a central bank. In concrete terms, these items appear to signify nothing. Yet fiat money has an unquestioned and unparalleled ability to quickly and irreversibly complete a transaction, be it a multimillion-dollar stock trade or a back-alley drug deal.
Why should an imaginary asset play this critical role? There are numerous economic theories of the emergence of fiat money, but these commonly fall into two broad categories (Kahn and Roberds 2009 ). The first group of explanations (the "Mahagonny theories" 1 ) postulates that the value of fiat money arises principally from laws that compel its use. A second group of explanations (the "Peter Pan theories" 2 ) argues that fiat money is universally accepted precisely because it is believed to be so.
To evaluate the applicability of these theories, this paper will briefly examine the experience of an innovative fiat money regime, introduced by the Bank of Amsterdam in the late seventeenth century and persisting until the downfall of the Dutch Republic in 1795. And while elements of the Mahagonny and Peter Pan stories are recognizable in the Amsterdam narrative, we will argue a third explanation (working name: "Icarus") better fits the facts. That is, by moving to a fiat (or near-fiat) monetary standard, the merchant community of Amsterdam was for a time able to escape the ill effects of contemporary commodity money. Aided by the force of law and custom, imaginary money on the Bank's ledgers succeeded because it was more reliable than the real stuff.
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Amsterdam's monetary system was however a delicate construct that, like Icarus' waxen wings, could be subject to sudden and catastrophic failure. The Bank collapsed in 1795 following a period of intense exploitation that ran directly counter to its founding principles. But the downfall occurred only after the Bank had helped bring prosperity to Amsterdam, in the process attaining a degree of monetary sophistication that would not be replicated until the twentieth century.
Competition and Political Economy
To describe the Bank of Amsterdam's evolution, we begin with the Bank's ecosystem. It was economic in that the Bank offered a ledger-money that grew into a distinct unit of account and medium of exchange. The situation was also political. The City of Amsterdam did not have its own mint, so the city used the Bank to assert monetary power. The Bank's political economy was part of a system because Bank money competed with other monies: coins, bank accounts, bills of exchange, etc. Finally, the monetary competition was strategic because governmentsponsored suppliers of money relied on legal privileges, and capitalizing on those advantages created spillovers on other suppliers.
This environment created a policy trade-off between seigniorage and monetary efficiency for each monetary institution and its controlling political authority. The classic example is of a mint that could debase its coins, within limits, to gain more revenue. Debasement increased seigniorage, but at the expense of monetary stability. For another example, a public (usually municipal) bank could lend large amounts. This created interest revenue, but it weakened the bank. Here, we will use seigniorage in a broad sense of rents accruing to the monetary institution, the con- compounded by the circulation of many foreign coins within the Republic, often from neighboring jurisdictions: by the start of the seventeenth century, over one thousand different types of coin were legally recognized (Dehing and 't Hart 1997: 40) .
In contrast, the pan-European competition among international monies occurred beyond the legal domain of any one political authority, or cluster of local authorities. Competition was not framed by legally derived spillovers, so bad money was shunned. Bills of exchange were the dominant form of international payment, and markets for bills flourished only where efficient monies were available as a settlement medium (Flandreau et al. 2009 however, the city and its Bank moved towards lending and away from stability. Domestic seigniorage increased, but the change greatly damaged the international demand for the bank guilder. The story came to a swift conclusion in 1795.
Founding
The City of Amsterdam opened the Bank of Amsterdam in January 1609. The exchange bank was modeled after Venice's Banco di Rialto (van Dillen 1934: 79) . The Venetians had introduced a municipal bank in response to private bank failures. Amsterdam took the idea but used it instead to insulate the bill market from debasement. The debasement problem had its roots in the political structure of the Dutch Republic. The governing body of the Republic, the Staten General, issued mint ordinances that specified the weight, fineness and legal value of Dutch coins. For example, these elements combined to give the 1606 rijksdaalder coin a nominal value 5 (called the mint equivalent) of 22.5 guilders per mark of pure silver (Polak 1998b: 70) . 4 The national government, however, did not have a mint. Instead, each province, and a few cities, had one, so the Netherlands had multiple producers of the same coin (Polak 1998a: 16-7) . The mints competed for customers through the quality of the coins produced and the amount of fees charged. One would expect high-quality coins produced at a low cost would attract the most business.
Instead, mints had incentives to debase, and those incentives required the complicity of mint customers. Why? A mint could secretly issue debased coins, but such behavior could not go on long before detection by money changers, and a subsequent loss of business (Rolnick, Velde, and Weber 2006) . But Dutch debasement continued through the Revolt years and in subsequent periods of war. How? Mints shared the profits of debasement with customers like money changers and others with specialist knowledge of coins. Mints did this by giving out more coins with less metal per coin. For example, ordinances specified that 9.5 rijksdaalders contain a mark of pure silver (Polak 1998b: 70) ; in modern units, the "guilder" embodied in a rijksdaalder contained about 11 grams of silver. By reducing the silver content of each coin by a small amount (generally 2 percent or less), a mint could produce a few more coins from a given weight of silver.
5
The legal value of a coin did not change with the silver content, so the mint could share this extra purchasing power with its customers. Those intermediaries could then pass the debased coins onto the unaware (Munro 2012) . Eventually, the light coins would be used to settle debts, for creditors often had to accept the coins at their legal value, whether aware of debasement or not (Quinn and Roberds 2009a) . A mint could still profit even if it returned all the metal from de-6 basement to its customers, for debasement brought increased volume, so a mint could collect standard fees more frequently (Quinn and Roberds 2009b) .
To illustrate how this competition worked in practice, it may be instructive to examine the coin production of two particular provincial mints (of Holland and Utrecht) for the years just before the founding of the Bank of Amsterdam. We rely on assessments of the mints made by Staten officials, for the Republic regularly sent assayers to test mint output and levy fines if coins were too light. The fines, however, went to the controlling authority, so the system discouraged debasement only if the province or city did not want debasement. These records allow us to construct Table 1 , the quantity and quality of rijksdaalder production by each mint. Column A translates the assessed silver contents into guilders per mark pure silver. Holland's coins were found acceptable (less than the maximum allowed tolerance) while Utrecht's coins were found to be debased. Column B reports rijksdaalder production in marks of pure silver. The last column reports the total revenue (brassage and seigniorage) that this volume would generate by assuming that each mint charged customers the ordinance mint price of 22.15 guilders per mark. The bottom row tells the story. Utrecht produced slightly debased coin (4 tenths of one percent lighter than Holland), yet Utrecht had over 6 times Holland's production and 8 times Holland's revenue. Utrecht offered less silver per coin, yet customers clearly preferred Utrecht. We suspect, but cannot prove, that Utrecht attracted that business by sharing some the debasement revenue. In this way, Utrecht customers got more guilders per mark than Holland customers.
A consequence of widespread, modest debasement was that debtors paid creditors with debased coin. That was bad for the bills of exchange market because international merchants had choices regarding where to send bills. Cities competed to provide the best environment for the settlement of bills, and efficient settlement relied on a number of factors including a reliable unit of account.
Debasement meant that the guilder delivered less silver than decreed and that the amount of lightness was unclear. Dutch debasement was not so severe that the bill market was imperiled. If debasement was so extreme as to be easily detected, then creditors might attempt legal re-8 sistance. Instead, debasement was a nettlesome problem made worse because mints outside Holland were creating it.
With the political structure of the Republic unable to impose mint discipline, Amsterdam took action, and the loose political structure of the Dutch Republic that allowed mints to debase also Table 2 ).
The restrictions and fees eliminated arbitrage profits. They also made the Bank of Amsterdam an expensive place to put coin for short periods and a cheap place to put coins for long periods.
A 2 percent fee on a one month deposit makes for an annualized interest rate of over 24 percent!
In contrast, coins deposited in perpetuity never paid a fee, so the Bank saw limited metal flows in or out. Instead, people circulated balances between accounts, also at no fee. The Bank did not issue notes, so bank guilder circulation was strictly between accounts. The transacting parties 9 could go to the Bank together, but the common process was for a payor, or his proxy, to attend the Bank and push money to the payee's account. 6 The success of the enterprise, however, required people to deposit coin, and it is not obvious that the Bank of Amsterdam offered better terms than the private cashiers who supplied similar payment services. So, true to the Mahagonny theories, in 1609 the city also banned cashiers and required that all bills of exchange above 600 guilders be settled on the Bank's ledgers. This legal monopoly was however never perfectly enforced, but it did create demand for deposits, for the Bank's metal stock grew from zero to 925,562 guilders during its first year and to 1,403,675 during its second year (Van Dillen 1934: 117) . 7 The city soon (1621) re-allowed cashiers, but the Bank's leaky monopoly on bill settlement endured.
Given the expense of transacting at the Bank, we believe that the chief reason the bill market came to prefer the Bank was in order to protect creditors against debasement. In the process, the Bank assured international creditors where, how and with what bills would be settled. The Peter Pan effect could work to keep costs down: if the Bank was sufficiently popular, coins were rarely withdrawn and withdrawal fees were not incurred. Finally, the whole was designed to be stable.
The Bank was not designed to lend, so substantial reserves and the implicit backing of the city protected the collateral. 
Policy and Innovation
The Bank of Amsterdam supplied a ledger-money that it could destabilize through lending to gain rents. The Bank's early decades were spent exploring this trade-off. Within its first decade, the Bank lent to the young Dutch East India Company, the great government-sponsored enterprise of the age. The Bank also lent to the City of Amsterdam, the Amsterdam Lending Bank, and to select individuals like mint masters (Uittenbogaard 2009: 124) . Lending paid interest to the Bank and assisted politically important institutions, but it also made the Bank vulnerable to runs. After its first two decades, the Bank's outstanding loans of 2.1 million guilders exceeded the bank's metal stock of 1.6 million guilders (van Dillen 1934: 117) .
The Bank started with a policy analogous to modest debasement, and then policy shifted towards stable money. We do not know why, but the Bank began to reduce its lending. From 1630 to 1650 deposits more than doubled as lending shrank by half. Aggressive lending, defined as loans exceeding metal stock, did not return until the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War (1780-4). Figure 1 shows the change using the Bank's overall balances and metal stock at the end of each fiscal year In acknowledgement of circulating reality, the Republic increased the legal value of patagons to 2.5 guilders in 1638. The result for the Bank, however, was arbitrage. People could now make an immediate return (4 percent less fees) by depositing patagons and withdrawing rijksdaalders.
The Bank soon ran out of rijksdaalders, and, to save the enterprise, the Bank unilaterally switched to issuing out patagons at withdrawal. The change ended the arbitrage run, but it also broke covenant, for all depositors had their collateral reduced by 4 percent. The Bank had abandoned the Republic's coinage. Then, grasping for a way to repair collateral values, the Bank 13 stumbled into a unique solution of pricing patagons at 2.4 guilders instead of 2.5 (van Dillen: 362). At that price, a withdrawal received 4 percent more coins to counteract the 4 percent less silver per coin. In doing this, the city and its Bank broke from Republic ordinances that priced the patagon at 2.5.
Today, this practice of discounting ("haircutting") collateral is standard procedure at virtually every central bank. But for the time it was an act of political defiance, and one with an unanticipated consequence, for a patagon in Amsterdam now had two prices: 2.4 guilders at the Bank and 2.5 guilders outside the Bank. Two prices meant that the Bank now had a distinct unit of account that came to be called the bank guilder. For years prior, bank money had represented a rijksdaalder while cashier accounts represented a patagon. Now, both the Bank and cashiers used the same coin to back different amounts of guilders: 2.5 current guilders versus 2.4 bank guilders.
A distinct unit of account was an unintended, but helpful innovation, for now a market developed to price the exchange rate between bank and current guilders (Quinn and Roberds 2007) . That exchange rate was called the agio, and it was measured as the ratio of current guilders per bank guilder. For example, a patagon had a bank agio at deposit of 1.04 (2.5 current/2.4 bank). Leaving the bank, the same coin had a bank agio of around 1.025 (1.04 less a typical 1.5 percent withdrawal fee). Cashiers learned to trade bank guilders for coins at a market agio usually within that spread. For example, a cashier could buy bank guilders at 1.03 by having the buyer transfer bank guilders to the cashier's account (no Bank fee). In return, the cashier would give the seller coins at cashier's shop outside the Bank (again, no Bank fee). Both sides got a better price than using the Bank's deposit/withdrawal window.
14 The emergence of a market agio had a few consequences for the Bank. People had even less reason to move coins in or out of the Bank because it was cheaper to get the same result using the secondary market. This reduced Bank revenue but it made bank money more liquid (easier to convert). So the agio market moved the Bank's policies away from rents and towards monetary efficiency.
The dual unit of account arrangement was so thoroughly adopted that the system endured even when the Republic finally purged the patagon. In 1659, the Republic introduced two new silver coins, the silver dukaat and the silver rijder, and each was assigned a legal tender value in bank guilders and current guilders.
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Did the agio help stabilize bank money? Based on our examination of ledgers starting in 1666, the Bank did not try to manipulate or manage the agio. Instead, the Bank let the agio float, so high agios attracted new deposits while low agios encouraged withdrawals. This specie-flow mechanism kept the agio anchored around 4 percent, but the process caused the stock of bank money to decline over the years because low agios were more frequent that high agios.
The Bank responded to this long-term decline by occasionally engaging in another, surprisingly modern type of policy-expanding the stock of Bank money by buying large amounts of silver bullion (as much as 10 metric tons in a single month; see Quinn and Roberds 2010: 21) . The Bank waited to execute open market purchases until the agio was particularly strong, because bank guilders would buy more silver than usual. The Bank did occasionally sell some silver, but the net effect was to counteract the decline in deposits. The stock of bank guilders stayed between 6 and 8 million guilders from 1659 to 1683.
the province of Holland and the Dutch East India Company suspended debt payments while the Bank of Amsterdam maintained convertibility. Still, the shaken Bank raised fees to discourage withdrawals, and those fees also discouraged deposits (Quinn and Roberds 2010: 9) . By the mid-1670s, the Bank supplied a well-backed money with deep secondary liquidity, but it suffered from high primary costs, a wide-ranging agio, and little revenue generation. Figure 2 shows the stagnation of the Bank's balances in this era. • People could now withdraw the same coin that they had previously deposited. To track this system of specific collateral, the Bank began issuing negotiable receipts at deposit.
• A receipt charged a much lower fee to remove coin than traditional withdrawal: ¼ percent for most silver coins and ½ percent for gold coins. The traditional fee was 1 to 2
percent.
• The Bank ended the right of traditional withdrawal, meaning people could no longer demand coin because they had an account balance. Instead, people needed an account balance to pay for the coin and a receipt granting the right to buy the coin.
The last change effectively made the bank guilder a fiat medium of exchange. This innovation made the bank guilder similar to money in a modern central bank account in that both can be transferred but neither is inherently convertible. Extending the analogy, the receipt behaved like a modern repurchase agreement. Like a repo, people delivered coin as collateral to the Bank, and they received a loan of credit to their account. They were also given a receipt, i.e., an option to repurchase the coin. 10 When people repurchased the coin, they also paid a fee, so the fee acted as a 6 month interest payment. If people did not repurchase the coin, then they kept the bank guilders and the Bank kept the coin. The analogy to modern central bank repo, however, has caveats. The Bank of Amsterdam did not manipulate the interest rate (the fee structure) or the quantity contracted (unlimited). Also, a receipt could be rolled over in 6 month increments by paying only the fee, and the receipt could be transferred. With transfer, receipts developed their own resale market.
More people used the Bank because it was now cheaper to later leave the Bank. Flows into and flows out of the Bank sped up, and now people paid a fee each half-year, whether they removed coins from the Bank or extended the option (Quinn and Roberds 2010: 18 The net effect of all that flow was a rise in deposits of about 4 million bank guilders in the first decade of the new regime. Figure 3 reports the annual balances for this innovative era. A second surge of deposits came after the end of the Nine Years' War in 1697. Why did more coin want to stay at the Bank than ever before? Low fees made the Bank a cheaper place to park coin, so more transient capital moved in. Easy access to that liquidity (short-term loans) and to that collateral (transferable receipts) deepened the Amsterdam bill market.
11 Annual fee revenue calculated by subtracting interest revenue from total revenue for each year. All data from AMA 5077/1318-1322.
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Figure 3. Bank of Amsterdam 1610 to 1650
Source: van Dillen 1934: 117-23.
A potential downside was that international "hot" money could leave the Bank as quickly as it came. The new fiat nature of the bank guilder, however, increased the stability of the Bank, for a run could no longer be larger than the stock of outstanding receipts. The Bank could not fail if it kept the receipt-coins in its vaults. Bank guilders unencumbered by a receipt, and there were about 8 million in 1683, were solely vulnerable to the market agio. A declining agio would cost account holders purchasing power, but the Bank itself would not be undone. Changing the threat from the discontinuity of a potential suspension to the continuity of a price decline was a stabilizing innovation.
In terms of political economy, the monetary innovations of 1683 helped Amsterdam become the preferred place for people to operate the bill market. In modern parlance, the bank guilder was winning the competition for the status of international reserve currency. The new fee structure had the Bank making money on this popularity. After 1683, the Bank begins to share its sei- gniorage with the City of Amsterdam. At first, the Bank made zero interest 'loans' that the city never repaid (Quinn and Roberds 2010: 26) . In the eighteenth century, the city switched to just taking the Bank's annual profits.
With the introduction of the receipt system, the monetary transformation of Amsterdam (and de facto the Republic) was now complete. The most liquid asset in the economy was no longer coin, but a sort of "virtual banknote" residing in Bank of Amsterdam accounts. The beauty of this scheme lay in its subtlety: to anyone holding balances and a receipt, Bank money corresponded simply to the coin that had been deposited. To those not holding a receipt, coins could be readily purchased in Amsterdam's liquid market. In this sense, the Bank's rather abstract form of money did not directly confront the monetary authority of the Staten, or the primacy of coin. 
Hegemony
In the 1700s, the bank guilder became the leading money for settling bills, and Amsterdam became the hub of the international bill market. Lucien Gillard (2004) calls it the European guilder (le florin européen), and Adam Smith devotes many pages to explaining how the bank guilder works (Smith 1776: 446-55) . Bills on Amsterdam were more widely available (in 85 percent of commercial cities) than bills on any other location in Europe (Flandreau et al. 2009 ). The reforms of 1683 formed the bedrock of the bank guilder's preeminence, but in this section we identify two complementary developments that promoted the hegemony of the bank guilder. The Dutch Republic stabilized the quality of its coin production, and merchant banking made Amsterdam the capital of credit. The former was a political solution that finally solved an old problem while the latter was an economic solution that produced a new problem.
The introduction of new coins in 1659 did not solve the old problem of multiple mints producing legal tender coins. Provinces, beginning with Zeeland in 1676, began introducing light coins that tried to play patagon to reformed coins of 1659 (Quinn and Roberds 2010: 37-8) . By 1688, production of the new arensdaalder and florijn coins outpaced traditional trade coins at the provincial mints (Polak 1998a: 196-7) . The province of Holland, however, opposed the trend, and instead promoted a new gulden (guilder) coin to act as the standard for current money. This battle did not affect the collateral at the Bank of Amsterdam, for the Bank took none of the new coins at its receipt window. But the deteriorating quality of circulating coin did push up the agio on bank money. It peaked at 12.5 percent in January 1693 (McCusker 1978: 48) .
The coinage battle turned into a political fight as Holland banned the light coins in 1690 and got the Republic to do the same in 1694 (Polak 1998a: 199-200) . Some municipal mints were paid to close, and the remaining mints accepted the non-debased gulden coin as the standard. Holland had finally succeeded in ending the mint chaos through political power, and the Republic's silver coins entered a period of enduring stability. That resolution also ended pressure on the Bank's agio from domestic mint standards, so coin stability translated into agio stability.
To see the agio over a very long period, Figure 4 plots a monthly agio from January 1653 to January 1780. Some eras, like 1700 to 1720, have few observations, but long-term trends can be discerned with the assistance of a polynomial (3 rd order) trend line. In particular, the agio in- In Amsterdam, no merchant bank beyond de Neufville failed, so the Bank's policies were a local success. Outside Amsterdam, however, ruin was widespread. The bill market in Hamburg shut 25 down for months, and Prussia suspended commercial debts. The result was that the markets that feed demand to Amsterdam shrank and began relying more on London (Carlos and Neal 2011) .
The weakening of Amsterdam relative to London continued after another major panic in 1772-3.
While the Bank of Amsterdam was solid, Europe was learning that the Dutch banking system was not. The hegemony of the bank guilder slipped.
Decline and Collapse
The 
Conclusion
Amsterdam created its Bank in response to a destabilizing version of monetary competition. The initial design of the Bank was fairly unimaginative and it was only partly successful at discouraging debasement. Through a series of largely improvised policies, however, the bank guilder developed into an almost unbeatable competitor in the international market for settlement. Such The success of the Bank of Amsterdam over many decades followed from primarily the city of Amsterdam's ability and willingness to not unduly exploit the Bank. The sharp fall of the bank guilder in the 1780s highlights the importance of the previous era of forbearance. The "waxen wings" of the 1683 receipt system would carry the Bank to great heights, if in the end it journeyed too close to the sun.
